台灣派的枷鎖：鞏固領導中心

昨天自由時報這篇『馬挾765萬票自我催眠』裡頭提到，一個政黨即使受到民意支持而取得權力，並不代表可以為所欲為，還是要經過民意不斷地監督。

這是我們用來堅持『ＥＣＦＡ必須人民同意』的理由。

最近針對民進黨的台南縣長提名事件，我看到許多台派知識份子提出「鞏固領導中心」的言論，要求台灣派既然當初支持蔡英文當黨主席，現在就應該支持她的決定，相信她能帶領台灣派走出困境，要不然當初何必找她當黨主席。

這樣的邏輯思考是權威統治時代的邏輯思考，跟我心中對民主政治的認知南轅北轍。如果這種邏輯合理，那等於說那些當初票投馬英九的 765 萬台灣人既然已經投了票就應該相信馬英九會帶領台灣走向榮景。我們再也沒有立場要求那些人站出來反對馬英九的親中政策。

我完全無法相信，這樣的觀念會廣為台派知識份子視為理所當然並欣然接受。當這樣的言論由台灣派的知識份子提出，而且變成台灣知識份子的主流時，我們已經在扮演「我們一直在批判的角色」而不自知。


同時讓我震驚的，是在這些所謂「顧大局」的勸言中，台南縣人的民意完全被忽略。

當我們堅持民主與自由做為台灣獨立的基本價值時，我們怎能完全漠視人民的需求？一個完全忽視人民需求的政治勢力，還能昧著良心「標榜民主」嗎？

以權威時代的心態與作法，不把人民的需求擺在第一，在民主投票的競賽過程中，結果終將是被人民拋棄。我們自己選擇了這個必敗的命運，然後再來抱怨 Taiwanese are stupid （台灣人是愚蠢的）?

到底是人民拋棄了我們，還是我們拋棄了人民？

這些震驚非同小可，讓我這個在台灣政治網路論壇上混了十年的老鳥突然驚覺：台灣要走到一個獨立自主的民主自由國家，遠比我之前想像的要艱難得多。

Newslets(090414) - Corruption Survey, Indifferent soldiers, Jumbo Signboard

Just Tell Me If You Are Corrupt, Damn It! (09.04.13) - In response to Ma Ying-jeou's rage over the high rising corruptions under his less-than-a-year administration, the administration of corruption-tainted army (買官弊案 今移審板院), Ministry of National Defense (MND), establishes an anti-corruption taskforce MND Special Unit of Anti-corruption Reconstruction Movement (國防部廉政建設行動專案編組), convened by the Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-min (陳肇敏) himself.

To get a grip of how corrupt the army is, the Unit kick starts her investigation with a Survey of Self-Clearance Investigation (自清問卷調查) to ask military officers if they are corrupt. (馬總統重話要肅貪 陳肇敏親任國防部廉政行動召集人, 靠「問卷」查貪？李慶華：國防部玩假的！失敗就下台！)


Soldiers Watch On-going Robbery (09.04.14) - A robbery happened in a supermarket in Kinmen island. At least 5 soldiers stood inside the store watching without doing anything. One of them chased after the robber, but was called back by his colleagues. (金門超商遇劫 5軍人冷血旁觀)


Coordination by Jumbo Ads Signboard (09.04.15) - Last week the DPP completed a controversial nomination to pick Lee Chun-yee(李俊毅) for the 2009 Tainan County Magistrate election later this year. Lee's nomination rival, Mark Chen (陳唐山), who is much more favored by Tainan County residents, insists to answer to voters' call. In his two terms of service in that same position before, Chen enjoyed #1 approval rate every year for 8 straight years in surveys covering all magistrates and mayors in Taiwan. A recent public opinion poll against potential KMT nominee shows that he still enjoys 65% support, 19% larger than Lee's (陳唐山︰民調挺我).

After failing to persuade Chen to give up, Lee puts up 3 jumbo signboards along the highway which reads: "Old Magistrate, Please! Yield to New Generations" (請老縣長、牽成後輩). (李俊毅設Ｔ霸 望陳唐山牽成). The cost of each signboard is said to be $NT 200,000 (~ 6,500 US$).

China Has Excess of 32 Million More Young Men Than Women

"Destroy by population" is like an arsenate poison in
the soft drink -- by the time you know, you are dead.

A report published in the British Medicine Journal presents the research result on the ratio of males to females under age of 20 in China (the highlight is mine):

4,764,512 people under the age of 20 were included. Overall sex ratios were high across all age groups and residency types, but they were highest in the 1-4 years age group, peaking at 126 (95% confidence interval 125 to 126) in rural areas. Six provinces had sex ratios of over 130 in the 1-4 age group. The sex ratio at birth was close to normal for first order births but rose steeply for second order births, especially in rural areas, where it reached 146 (143 to 149). Nine provinces had ratios of over 160 for second order births. The highest sex ratios were seen in provinces that allow rural inhabitants a second child if the first is a girl. Sex selective abortion accounts for almost all the excess males. One particular variant of the one child policy, which allows a second child if the first is a girl, leads to the highest sex ratios.

With the conclusion:

In 2005 males under the age of 20 exceeded females by more than 32 million in China, and more than 1.1 million excess births of boys occurred. China will see very high and steadily worsening sex ratios in the reproductive age group over the next two decades. Enforcing the existing ban on sex selective abortion could lead to normalisation of the ratios.

Imaging that Taiwan's total population is only 23 million. The number of Chinese young men who can't find a wife is 1.5 times larger than Taiwan's population, and getting worse ...

And recall China government's effort to destroy Tibetan's culture by massive migration of Chinese into Tibet after Chinese invaded Tibet ...

This does sound a serious alarm especially when Ma Ying-jeou's trying impatiently to annex Taiwan to China. After all, when you are tightly bound to China, you have to share everything China has, not just the fantasy of imagined economy benefits.

So, a serious warning for any one wants to marry a Taiwanese lady: you might not want to wait until Ma Ying-jeou opens doors to all those competitors ...

Flowcharting DPP's 2009 Nomination Measures

[ Note: The content of this post is similar to the previous
one written in Chinese, 圖解民進黨2009選舉提名辦法) ]

DPP's nomination of Lee Chun-yee (李俊毅), who received public support rate by nearly 20% less than another qualified candidate Mark Chen (陳唐山), for Tainan County municipal election later this year has triggered heated conflict between supporters of both sides.

Mark Chen and his supporters criticize that DPP has been hijacked by faction(s), that DPP neglects the opinion of Tainan residents, and that DPP violates the rules set by DPP herself.

Those who support the decision of DPP criticize that Chen violates the consensus agreed previously, that he is power-thirsty, that he fails to consider the greater good.

There are predictions that DPP might split apart due to this nomination, which shows how serious the problem is.

Because that both DPP headquarters and Mark Chen accuse each other of violating the pre-agreed competing rules, the details of DPP's nomination rules as well as how DPP executes it become the spot from where we can find how we got here.

I posted DPP's nomination rules Coordination Measures of Candidate Recruitment for the 2009 Municipal Elections and the Seventh Legislator By-Elections (represented by Measures in this post below).

This post presents the flowchart with some analysis.

Note that:

• The numbers on both sides identify steps in corresponding to original articles. Article 3 is missing because it is not a procedure;


• Each step is marked with (number);


• Each decision branch is marked with [number];


• There are 4 paths to reach a single nominee, marked with number in open circle;


• You can click to see larger chart;


• As usual, errors, if any, is on me.

DPP explained in several occasions that that their current nomination rule is not only a "recruitment" plan, but a "total recruitment" plan.

That means, no matter what factors are considered, the Campaign Strategy Unit (CSU, 選戰策略小組, the unit responsible for picking a nominee for each constituency) and the party President have the final authority to decide whom to be nominated.

That's how they justify the nomination of a less favored candidate.

Is this statement in line with their Measures?

Following the flowchart above, a nominee is to be selected through one of 4 paths.

Among them, the Path 1, 2, and 4 are decided solely by CSU, thus no problem with them.

But the Path 3 doesn't seem to be that way.

It happens in a condition that the CSU is unable to decide whom to pick from multiple qualified candidates (step (7)), followed by an unsuccessful coordination among those candidates (step (2.2)). It then comes to a situation regulated by Article 6.1:

『協調對象對解決競爭機制有共識，經選戰策略小組同意者，依其共識方式解決，產生人選。』
6.1 If all potential nominees reach a consensus on a competition rule, and the rule is approved by the CSU, the nominee will be decided by that rule;

It states clearly that the consensus (on how to pick) needs to be OKed by the CSU. Therefore, the existence of a consensus -- as what happened -- indicates that the CSU agrees to the selection rule(s) defined by the consensus, which could be anything but "recruitment."

Furthermore, the Measures doesn't grant the CSU any right to reject the nominee selected by that consensus.

That is, as long as a nominee is selected following the consensus (don't forget, it is pre-approved by the CSU), the only option the CSU has is to nominate that person.

It defines a transfer of the decision-making power from the CSU to "candidates plus CSU." The Measures doesn't transfer that power back to the CSU thereafter.

This is no longer a "recruitment" process.

Therefore, although the term "Recruitment" does show up in the title of Measures, the nature of recruitment exists only in Path 1,2 and 4. The nomination Path 3 is decided by a consensus reached by all candidates and CSU and has no recruitment nature.

Thus, unless DPP follows a under-the-table secret rule that is different from the Measures, it is obvious that the statement "total recruitment" doesn't fit in line with their own Measures.

It would probably be in DPP's own best interest to come up with better explanations to justify their nomination process.

Note that there's nowhere in the Measures says that the party president has the right to reject the nominee submitted by the CSU. Terms like "the president approves..." or "to the president for approval" doesn't exist.

That is, when a nominee is selected through one of the 4 paths, not only the only option of the CSU is to submit it to the president, but also the only option the president has is to submit it to the Central Executive Committee for approval.

Not only so. The president is not granted the right to 'pick from a list' either. The Measures says that either the CSU or "CSU+candidates" has the power of 'pick one from a list." Not the president.

The Measures in fact renders the president a rubber stamp such that if she/he wants to inject her/his own view into the nomination process, she/he can only do that before a single nominee is selected.

There's another big hole in the Measures - the step (2.1) on the top-right corner. If things develop to that situation, the Measures doesn't define what to do.

No idea if all those loopholes are due to carelessness. No matter what, it is how the Measures is written.

The current available information seems to show that, in the beginning, Mark Chen didn't have the intention to compaign at all. He was in fact "recruited" by Su Jia-chuan (蘇嘉全), the convener of CSU, into the selection process.

That is, Mark Chen had no intention to run but was recruited by DPP; he passed the CSU qualification evaluation, won over his opponent in the competition rules agreed upon by all candidates and the CSU (if that's what happened), and then ... sacked.

It is then followed by accusations from some of DPP's politicians and supporters that he is "power-thirsty" and "doesn't care for the greater good".

I wonder what I would do if I were put in that situation.

圖解民進黨2009選舉提名辦法

[ Note: The content of this post is similar to a newer one written in English, Flowcharting DPP's 2009 Nomination Measures ]

民進黨上週針對今年底台南縣長提名人選，捨棄了民調較高的陳唐山而選擇了民調較低的現任立委李俊毅，在支持者之間引起了激烈的爭議。

陳唐山及其支持者批評民進黨被派系挾持、漠視台南縣民意、違反自己訂下的遊戲規則，而支持民進黨決議的一方則批評陳唐山違反提名辦法規定、權力薰心、不顧大局。

有人甚至警告可能導致支持者的分裂。可見這次提名引發的風暴非同小可。

由於民進黨中央與陳唐山互指對方違反事先所同意的遊戲規則，因此民進黨的徵召辦法到底如何規定、如何執行，成為這個爭議的重要根源之一。

我之前已經貼出辦法全文：『二○○九年縣市長選舉暨第七屆立法委員補選徵召候選人參選協調辦法』（底下以「該辦法」簡稱）。底下畫成流程圖 (點選可看大圖）:


民進黨在辯護此次提名的正當性時，曾幾次公開強調，「該辦法」是「徵召制」，而且是「完全徵召制」，因此選戰策略小組與黨主席有權力全盤決定要「徵召誰」。

這個說法是否正確呢？

依上圖，單一提名人選的產生可經由 4 個途徑 （由圓圈＋1～4 號碼註明）。

其中第 1,2,4 途徑都是經過「選戰策略小組」產生單一人選，因此沒有問題。

但第 3 個途徑顯然不是如此。這個途徑是經過「選戰策略小組評估訪談報告無法決定單一人選」，而且「有協調需要但協調不成功」，而走到「第六條第一項」的：

『協調對象對解決競爭機制有共識，經選戰策略小組同意者，依其共識方式解決，產生人選。』

很清楚的，共識的成立必須經過選戰策略小組同意，因此有共識存在，表示選戰策略小組已經在「開始比賽」之前同意了「以達成的共識方式選出人選」。

而且，照該共識產生的人選，「該辦法」並沒有授權「選戰策略小組」否決該人選的權力。

亦即，一旦人選經過「共識方式」決定(不要忘了，這共識是事先經過選戰策略小組同意的），選戰策略小組唯一的選項，就是提名這個人。

這等於是把選戰策略小組的「有全盤決定權」的權力釋出，變成「參選人＋選戰策略小組共同決定」。

這樣已經不再是「徵召」了。

因此，雖然該辦法「號稱」是徵召辦法，但實質上只有 第1,2,4個途徑是徵召，這第 3 個途徑則是靠「參選人＋選戰策略小組」的共識決定。

因此，除非民進黨後來又有『沒有公佈且與該辦法不同』的秘密內規，否則民進黨當中央一再宣稱「提名辦法是完全徵召」，顯然與他們自己訂的「該辦法」不符。

那這個「共識」到底是什麼呢？現在雙方說法有衝突。

陳唐山與部分民進黨高層的認知裡，大家的共識是「誰民調超過第二名 9％以上就提名他」。因為他們認為民進黨在陳唐山因此共識出線後又反悔，因此導致陳唐山執意「按照共識」參選、葉國興退出選戰策略小組、以及14名中執委退出中執會。

而民進黨中央一再宣稱因為是「完全徵召制」，因此選戰策略小組有完全決定權。

但在此文證明，台南縣長提名屬於第三個途徑的情況，此時「該辦法」已無「完全徵召」之實。

因此民進黨如果要取信於支持者，恐怕必須拿出更好的說明。

補充：細看「該辦法」，並沒有「黨主席同意」的字眼。也就是說，「該辦法」並沒有授權給黨主席可以否定選戰策略小組所提交的提名人選。在經過第 1～4 個途徑產生了人選之後，選戰策略小組的唯一選項就是將其交給黨主席，而黨主席的唯一選項，就是「提交中執會」。

補充二：根據現有的資料，陳唐山原本無意參選，是民進黨在徵詢過程中，由選戰策略小組召集人蘇嘉全「徵召」他參選，陳唐山因此列入台南縣參選人之一，而得以與其他參選人達成「如何遴選提名者」的共識。

DPP's 2009 Nomination Measures

DPP's recent pick of Tainan County municipal nominee Lee Chun-yi (李俊毅) has triggered widespread controversy that could potentially split her supporters in Tainan - the former President Chen Shui-bian's hometown and DPP's strong hold for the past 16 years -- apart.

One of the issues is if DPP violates her own game rules by not nominating Mark Chen (陳唐山), who leads Lee CY by margins as large as 20% in more than one public opinion polls.

That is, both DPP decision makers and Mark Chen think the other party violate the rule.

I received DPP's nomination rules through an email, and translate it here for reference. Translation error(s), if any, is mine (corrections are welcome). The items marked with red, item 6.1, is where DPP's current situation is.

Coordination Measures of Candidate Recruitment for the 2009 Municipal Elections and the Seventh Legislator By-Elections By the 13th Central Executive Committee, 2nd meeting September 24th, 2008
1.	This Measures is based on the decision made in the 1st meeting of the 13th National Representative Congress.
2.	To consult and coordinate the nominees and plan for campaign strategies, a 2009 Campaign Strategy Unit (CSU) is established, consists of one convener and several members, appointed by the party president.
3.	The consulting and coordination of nominees should follow the principle of meritocracy to pick the the capable for the party. The CSU should combine the evaluations on integrity and ability, the values and beliefs, the support by the people, and to strengthen the trust of people to this party.
4.	The CSU should establish a Consultant Unit (CU) in each constituency and appoint one convener each to take charge of the potential nominees of that area.
	CSU would consolidate a list of potential nominees (according to what CU submits) , with that each CU should conduct interviews and submit the report to CSU for discussion.
5	If, after the above processes, there's only one potential nominee,
5.1.	(CSU) should submit an evaluation report, and recommend the party president to submit the said nominee to Central Executive Committee (中執會) for approval and conducting nomination process.
5.2.	If after the consulting there are more than one potential nominees, and if CSU's evaluation indicates the need of coordination, (CSU) should compile a list of nominees to coordinate, and suggest the party president to recruit coordinators.
5.3.	If a nominee is decided following the above process, CSU will go ahead with the process 5.1.
6.	If there's no way to coordinate a single nominee in a constituency, follow the steps below:
6.1	If all potential nominees reach a consensus on a competition rule, and the rule is approved by the CSU, the nominee will be decided by that rule;
6.2	If no consensus on any competition rule can be reached, then CSU will select one based on the campaign strategy.
6.3	After a nominee suggestion is decided, CSU should go ahead with the 5.1.
7.	During CSU's process of consulting and coordination, all potential nominees should follow the party constitution and not to attack one another and not to hurt the image of the party. No action of trying to manipulate the fair process of consulting and coordination. Violators will not be considered as potential nominees, and will be submitted for punishment.
8.	This Measures takes effect after the approval by the CEC, and terminates after the nomination for 2009 Municipal Elections and the Seventh Legislator By-Elections.

二○○九年縣市長選舉暨第七屆立法委員補選徵召候選人參選協調辦法 二００八年九月二十四日第十三屆第二次中執會制訂
第一條	本辦法依本黨第十三屆第一次全國黨員代表大會決議制定之。
第二條	為徵詢、協調提名人選及研擬選戰策略，特設二○○九年選戰策略小組（以下簡稱選戰策略小組），置召集人一人，成員若干人，由主席任命之。
第三條	徵詢、協調提名人選，應以為黨舉才、為國選賢與能為原則，就人選之操守能力、價值信念，爭取民眾認同，強化民眾對本黨信任，作整體評估。
第四條	選戰策略小組應就各選區分別成立徵詢小組，並指定召集人一人，負責徵詢該選區可能提名人選。
	前項可能提名人選，由選戰策略小組成員研擬名單，由各該徵詢小組進行訪談，作成紀錄，提送選戰策略小組討論。
第五條	各選區可能提名人選於徵詢後，經選戰策略小組評估，有單一適當人選時，應作成評估報告，並建請主席提交中央執行委員會同意，進行徵召提名作業。
	各選區可能提名人選於徵詢後，倘適當人選在兩人（含）以上，經選戰策略小組評估，認有協調必要者，得擬具協調對象名單，建請主席延聘適當人選協調之。
	各選區經前項規定協調產生提名人選時，由選戰策略小組依第一項規定辦理。
第六條	各選區依前條規定協調但無法產生人選時，處理方式如下：
	一、協調對象對解決競爭機制有共識，經選戰策略小組同意者，依其共識方式解決，產生人選。
	二、協調對象對解決競爭機制無共識者，由選戰策略小組根據選戰策略，綜合評估之。
	依前項規定產生人選後，選戰策略小組應依第五條第一項規定辦理。
第七條	選戰策略小組進行徵詢、協調期間，可能提名人選應遵守本黨黨章之規定，不得相互攻訐，不得傷害本黨形象，並不得從事任何影響公平徵詢協調之情事，違者得不列入徵召對象，其情節嚴重者，並送交議決懲罰。
第八條	本辦法經中央執行委員會通過後施行，至完成二○○九年縣市長選舉暨第七屆立法委員補選提名後廢止。

Taiwan Representative to US Jason Yuan "Disguised" as an Ambassador ?

As Taiwan being pushed closer toward China, expect
to see more of this ego-feeding self-promotion shit.

Taiwan has no official diplomacy link with USA, so there's no so-called "Taiwan ambassador" to USA. The head of Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO), the official diplomatic office of Taiwan, is called "Representative" in the past decades.

However, Taiwan's Representative in US, Jason C. Yuan (袁健生), is now self-promoted to "Ambassador" in an official announcement by TECRO for the recent U.S. Congress-held reception in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). (Liberty Times report: 我駐美代表處 稱袁健生大使))

The screenshot (see below) of that announcement 美國聯邦參眾議員踴躍出席在國會舉行之「台灣關係法」立法30週年酒會) shows that the term "Ambassador Yuan" (袁大使）appears 7 times so it appears to be intended. (Click on it to see the larger image; click [here] to see the screenshot of entire page)


According to the Liberty Times, this doesn't seem to happen before. Sometimes people call him Ambassador in conversations out of politeness, but it has never been put in any official document. So a common reaction to this "official self-promotion" is what is behind this.

LT questions:

駐美代表處這樣做，美國政府如何看待？是否允許？以後駐美代表是否都可正式用「大使」自稱，並以此出現在官方文書或美國公開場合使用？

How would the USA government take this ? Will she allow (TECRO to call Representative Yuan as Ambassador)? Is it true that from now on Taiwan's representative in USA can claim to be Ambassador and use that term in official documents or in public ?

I can tell you in straight answer: IN--YOUR--DREAM !

See TECRO's official English version of that same announcement (Click on it to see the larger image. Click [here] for the screenshot of entire page):


All 7 places where the term "Ambassador Yuan" (袁大使) appears in the Chinese version are "Representative Yuan" in the English version.

It is obvious that he is self-promoted only in front of Taiwanese people.

Should we be surprised ?

Remind you that Jason Yuan is the major blue player who conspired in the base-less accusations of 'Bulletgate' conspiracy in 2004 (KMT gives Congress `Bulletgate', DPP counters `Bulletgate').

As Taiwan being pushed closer toward China, expect to see more of ego-feeding self-promotion shit in the future.

Uurrhhh ... the above statement doesn't seem to fit Ma Ying-jeou, who in fact going the other way around to insult and humiliate himself by downgrading from "President" to "Mr." ...

But ... come to think of it twice --- Ma humiliates himself ONLY in front of China. It seems to be a common ground that they have the gut to maintain a high attitude ONLY in front of Taiwanese people.